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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Another point raised by the respondent was that the motion to dis-
qualify was prematurely brought since the Civil Practice Act", only made
provision to vacate an award on grounds of partiality or bias on the part
of the arbitrators. The court dismissed this contention by claiming in-
herent power to control all litigation before it, and, in the absence of
express prohibition, disqualify an arbitrator before an award is made.19
In conclusion, the court here recognized that the tripartite type of
arbitration has evolved to the point where it is the accepted practice for
the arbitrators appointed by the parties to bear some relation to the ap-
pointing party, with the third arbitrator remaining neutral. 20
Because of the complexity of the disputes which are arbitrated, special
skill, experience and knowledge on the part of the arbitrators is invaluable
in reaching a just and speedy settlement. A person who lacked this back-
ground would require extensive instruction in the technicalities of the
subject matter of the dispute to have that degree of comprehension which
an experienced party would already possess. Undoubtedly these practical
considerations also prompted the New York Legislature, which changed
Section 1462 of the C.P.A. to conform to the common practice and usage
shortly after the HIP Medical Groups decision was reached.21
18 NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ACT, S 1462, subd. 2. This provision has been modified.
Cf. note 21, ff.
19 Cf. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Selly, 295 N.Y. 395, 68 N.E.2d 183 (1946);
Gaer Bros. v. Mott, 144 Conn. 303, 130 A.2d 804, 65 A.L.R. 2d 749 (1957).
20 This view is accepted as morally and socially correct. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS AND PROCEDURAL STANDARDS FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT ARBI-
TRATION, I, 8 (1951).
21 CPLR § 7511, subd. (b), par. 1, cl. (ii) signed into law on April 4, 1962: L. 1962,
ch. 308, eff. Sept. 1, 1963. This new law permits a vacatur of an award only where the
partiality is that "of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE ENGEL CASE
IN LIGHT OF PRECEDENT
The State Board of Regents of New York officially proposed the fol-
lowing prayer which they recommended and published as part of their
Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools:
Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence on thee, and we beg thy
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our country.'
The respondent, the board of education of the Union Free School Dis-
trict, No. 9, New Hyde Park, New York, directed the school district's
1 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962).
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principal to cause the above-mentioned prayer to be said aloud by each
class in the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each school day.
Proceedings were brought against the school district by five citizens who
are residents of the above-mentioned school district and whose children
attend schools run by the district. The proceedings were brought under
Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act of New York, seeking an order in the
nature of mandamus, directing the respondent school district to discon-
tinue use of the prayer. The basis of the petitioner's complaint was that
the prayer violated the religious liberty section of the New York State
Constitution and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which is enforced upon the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The applicable part of the First Amendment reads as follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an Establishment of Religion or
prohibiting the Free Exercise thereof.
The Supreme Court of New York2 held that the prayer did not violate
the State Constitution or the "Establishment Clause" of the First Amend-
ment. In order that the "Free Exercise Clause" would not be violated, the
court remanded to the school district in order that the district might pro-
vide safeguards against the possibility that a child who didn't want to say
the prayer or whose parents didn't wish the child to say it might be in-
sured of the right not to say it. The lower court's opinion was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, in a Per Curiam
opinion3 and by the Court of Appeals of New York in a divided opinion.4
The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction5 and
the case came to be heard. As is widely known both among legal and
non-legal circles, the Supreme Court in a 6-1 decision 6 held the prayer to
be in violation of the "Establishment Clause." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962).
The meaning of the "Establishment Clause" has been in controversy in
three major cases before the Supreme Court prior to the Engel case. The
purpose of this note will be to view the Engel case in the light of these
three precedent cases.
The first of these cases, Everson v. Board of Education,7 involved the
constitutionality of a local board of education of New Jersey paying the
transportation to and from school of secular school students as well as
2 Engel v. Vitale, 191 N.Y.S. 2d 453 (1959).
3Engel v. Vitale, 11 N.Y. App. Div. 340, 206 N.Y.S. 2d 183 (1960).
4 Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y. 2d 174, 218 N.Y.S. 2d 659, 176 N.E. 2d 579 (1961).
5 Engel v. Vitale, 368 U.S. 924 (1961).
6 justices White and Frankfurter took no part in this decision.
7 330 U.S.1 (1947).
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public school students. By a five to four decision the court held that this
program did not violate the "Establishment Clause" of the federal con-
stitution. Justice Black in writing for the majority stated what was to be-
come the fundamental test to determine whether a government program
violates the "Establishment Clause."
The 'Establishment of Religion' clause of the first amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government. . . . can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another ...
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion.8
The five to four decision of the court was not based on a fundamental dif-
ference of opinion as to what the meaning of the "Establishment Clause"
is or as to the test which Justice Black formulated. The difference of
opinion grew out of the application of this test to the particular facts at
hand. The majority felt that the financing by a local government body of
the transportation costs of secular school students was not giving aid to
support a religious activity because the furnishing of such costs is "sep-
arate and ... indisputably marked off from the religious function. .. ."
The four dissenters, however, looked upon this financing as an aid to a
religious activity. The minority felt that even though religious schools
would only benefit indirectly from such financing that this was enough
"aid" to come within the general prohibition which the majority had
formalized.
The second important case which was to deal with the meaning of the
"Establishment Clause" was the case of McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion.10 This case dealt with the constitutionality of an Illinois school
board's "Released Time Program." The Champaign Board of Education
had established a program whereby students who obtained their parents'
permission would be released from their regular school program and al-
lowed to attend religious instruction for a period of thirty minutes if the
students were in grade school or forty-five minutes if they were in high
school. This religious instruction was to be given in the public school
class rooms by qualified religious leaders of all denominations. Those stu-
dents who did not wish to attend such instructions would continue with
their regular class work. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that this pro-
gram was not a violation of the Illinois Constitution or the Federal Con-
stitution." The Supreme Court of the United States in an eight to one
decision, overruled the Illinois court and held that this program was a
violation of the "Establishment Clause." Justice Black, in writing for the
8Id. at 15. 9ld. at 18. 10 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
11 McCollum v. Board of Education, 396 I11. 14,71 N.E. 2d 161 (1947).
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majority, reaffirmed the test which he had formalized in the Everson case.
He explained that in this case Illinois was financing a religious activity
because they were allowing religious instructions to be given in public
buildings. This, of course, is a violation of the Everson test. Not only was
the State of Illinois aiding religious instruction through financing but the
majority also felt that they were aiding it through the use of the state's
compulsory school attendance legislation:
Here not only are the state's tax-supported public school buildings used for
the dissemination of religious doctrines. The state also affords sectarian groups
an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes
through use of the state's compulsory public school machinery. 12
The lone dissenter in the McCollum case, Justice Reed, did not disagree
with the majority's reaffirmance of the Everson test but only with its ap-
plication in this particular case:
It seems clear to me that the "aid" referred to by the court in the Everson
Case could not have been those incidental advantages that religious bodies,
with other groups similarly situated, obtain as a by-product of organized
society.'8
The third important precedent case dealing with the "Establishment
Clause" is Zorach v. Clauson.14 This case was decided four years after the
McCollum case and deals with a somewhat similar set of facts. The City
of New York had set up a "released time program" whereby students,
with their parent's permission, could be released from their regular school
sessions and allowed to attend religious instruction. However, unlike the
McCollum case the religious instructions were not given on school prem-
ises but in the religious institutions' own facilities. Justice Douglas, in
writing for a majority of six, reaffirmed the McCollum case but distin-
guished this "released time" program from the one found in Zorach be-
cause of the fact that here religious instruction was not given on school
premises. Justice Douglas reaffirmed the fundamental precept of the Ever-
son rule and held that here the government was not financing a religious
instruction, as they did in McCollum, but only accommodating "their
schedules to a program of outside religious instruction." 15
The minority of Justice Black, Frankfurter and Jackson held that the
Zorach case was not distinguishable from the McCollum case in that the
"released time" program in McCollum was an unconstitutional "aid" not
only because school premises were used for religious instruction, but also
because the state was affording sectarian groups an invaluable aid in help-
ing to provide pupils for religious instruction through the state's compul-
12 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
13 Id. at 249. 14 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 15 Id. at 315.
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sory public school machinery. Justice Frankfurter stated, in his dissenting
opinion, that he felt the majority had reversed the position that was up-
held in McCollum:
I agree with Justice Black that those principles [expressed by the court in
McCollum] are disregarded in reaching the result in this case. Happily they
are not disavowed .... 16
Some writers17 pointing to this statement of Justice Frankfurter, con-
cerning a reversal of principles on the part of the majority and statements
by Justice Douglas in the majority opinion in Zorachb' believe that the
Zoracb decision represents a basic change in the philosophy of the court
regarding the "Establishment Clause." However, this belief is not justified.
The principles that Justice Frankfurter referred to as being disregarded
are not the Everson principles but are those principles dealing with coer-
cion. In McCollum, the court found an unconditional degree of coercion
which they did not find in Zorach. This may be a retraction of part of
the McCollum decision, but it cannot be taken to mean a general change
in the basic philosophy concerning the "Establishment Clause" which phi-
losophy is formalized in the Everson test.
In retrospect it appears that, although the court has disagreed as to the
application of the Everson test in Everson, McCollum and Zorach, there
has developed a definite philosophy as to what the "Establishment Clause"
means and that this philosophy as formalized in Everson means at least
that government cannot finance religious activities. In the light of this
concept the Engel case will be analyzed.
In Engel the court held in a six to one decision that a mandatory read-
ing of a twenty-two word prayer was a violation of the "Establishment
Clause." Due to the fact that the New York courts had undertaken to
safeguard the voluntary joining in or not joining in by students in saying
the prayer, the court held that there was no infringement of the "Free
Exercise" clause. Justice Black in writing for the court stated that the
prayer was a "religious activity" undertaken by the government and as
such violates the "Establishment Clause." Justice Black states that it is an
16 Id. at 322.
17 See Reed, CHURCH-STATE AND THE ZORACH CASE, 27 NoTRm DAME LAWYER 529
(1952).
Is "We are a religious people whose institutions suppose a Supreme Being." Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313.
"The First Amendment ... does not say that in every and all respects there shall be
a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific
ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other.
That is the common sense of the matter. Otherwise the State and Religion would be
aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly. Id. at 312.
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aid to religion regardless of the fact that the prayer may be nondenom-
inational. He sums the point up when he states:
It is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for
any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program
carried on by the government. 19
It certainly appears that the court's opinion is in keeping with the Everson
test. Here we have a religious exercise, the saying of a prayer, conducted
by the government at government expense. The expense is that of the
teacher who must read the prayer aloud. It amounts to nothing less than
government financing of a religious exercise. This, of course, is the main
prohibition laid down by the Everson test. Justice Douglas in writing a
concurring opinion stated the issue as "whether the government can con-
stitutionally finance a religious exercise. '20 Phrasing the issue in this way
is exactly in keeping with the Everson test and its reaffirmance by the
court in holding the prayer unconstitutional simply follows the philoso-
phy that government may not finance religious exercises which philoso-
phy has been formalized and sustained in the Everson, McCollum and
Zorach cases. The Engel decision could not have been decided otherwise
unless the court had been prepared to abandon the philosophy which
precedent dictated.
The lone dissenter in the Engel case, Justice Stewart, held that this
nondenominational "expression of religious faith in and reliance upon a
Supreme Being" 2' did not violate the "Establishment Clause" because it
follows "the deeply entrenched and highly cherished spiritual traditions
of our nation."'22 He also states that if the "Establishment Clause" meant
that government could not finance religious exercises, then the payment
of chaplains' fees in various areas of government would be unconstitu-
tional. By implication, he holds that the "Establishment Clause" does not
prohibit government financing of religious exercises. Justice Stewart,
thus, is willing to abandon the philosophy of the Everson test which has
been established by precedent. The majority of the court, as has been
shown, was unwilling to abandon this precedent.
1OEngel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
20id. at 437.
21 1d. at 450 (footnote 9). 22 d. at 450.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF STATE REAPPORTIONMENT
The Constitution of the State of Tennessee vests the legislative power
of that state in a General Assembly consisting of a House of Representa-
tives and a Senate. Each county of the state is to have senators and rep-
